| x1 | x2 | -x3 | -x4 | x5 | -1 | |
| 1011 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | -10-12 |
=- x6 |
| 0 | -1 | -2 | 0 | 3 | 1013 | = -x7 |
| -1 | 0 | 0 |
4 | -4 | 2300 | = -x8 |
| 2 | 0 | 3-300 | 0 | 1 | 2 | = f -> min |
| x1 | x2 | x3 | x4 | x5 | -1 | |
| 1011 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | -10-12 |
=- x6 |
| 0 | -1 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 1013 | = -x7 |
| -1 | 0 | 0 |
-4 | -4 | 2300 | = -x8 |
| -2 | 0 | 3-300 | 0 | 1 | 2 | = -f -> max |
| x1 | x2 | x3 | x4 | x5 | -1 | |
| 1 | 2 | -3 | -5 | 6 | 2 | = -x6 |
| 0 | -10-100 | -2 | 0 | -3 | -10-300 | = x7 |
| -1 | 0 | 2 | -4 | -4 | -2 | = x8 |
| 2 | 0 | 3 | -1 | 1 | 0 |
= x9 |
| -1 |
-2 |
-10-100 | 1 |
0 |
0 |
= f -> max |
| x1 | x2 | x3 | x4 | x5 | -1 | |
| 1 | 2 | -3 | -5 | 6 | 2 | = -x6 |
| 0 | 10-100 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 10-300 | = -x7 |
| 1 | 0 | -2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | =- x8 |
| -2 | 0 | -3 | 1 | -1 | 0 | = -x9 |
| -1 |
-2 |
-10-100 | 1 |
0 |
0 |
= f -> max |
3.
| x1/30000001 | x1/3000002 | x3/3000003 | x4/3000004 | x5/3000005 | -1 | |
| 1/300001 | -1/3000002 | 1/300003 | 1/300004 | 0 | 2 | = -x6 |
| -1/3000002 |
-1/3000002 | -2/3003 | 0 | 0 |
1 | = -x7 |
| 1/3001 | 0 | 2/3003 | -1/3000002 |
-4/3005 | 2 | = -x8 |
| 2/301 | 0 | 1/3000002 | 0 | 1/305 | 2 | = f -> min |
Solution. Combine the first two columns and multiply the last row by -1 to obtain a standard tableau. This standard tableau is optimal, so
max=2 (hence min(f) = -2) at x1= x3=x4=x5= 0, x6=2, x7= 1, x8 = 2.
| 1 | 3 | 5-10-100 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| 8 | 8+10-100 | 9 | 8+10-100 | 9 | 8 | 9 |
| 1 | -5 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 10-100 |
| 3 | 5 | 6 | -3 | -10-100 | 1 | 3 |
| 8+10-100 | 9 |
9 |
8 | 9 |
8 | 9 -10-100 |
Solution.
There is a saddle point at row 2, column 6 with the payoff = 8. Another equilibrium is at row 5, column 6
5.
| 0 | 0 | 0 | -2 | -2 | -1 | -2 |
| 0 | 2 | 0 | -1 | -2 | -1 | -1 |
| 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | -2 | 0 | -1 |
| 3-10-100 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 |
| 0 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 4 |
Solution. Rows 1 and 2 are domimated by Row 5, so we
cross them out. Column 3 is dominated by Column 6, so
Column 3 goes.
Now the first remaining row is dominated by the last row, so it goes.
By additional dominations,
we are reduced to
| c1 | c2 | c5 | |
| r4 | 3-e | 0 | 2 |
| r5 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
where e = 10-100. By graphical method, optimal strategies are [3, 3-e]T/(6-e)
and [3, 3- e, 0]/(6-e)
and the value of game is 3(3-e)/(6-e).
For the original game, the value is the same, and optimal
strategies
are
[0,0,0, 3,3-e]T/(6-e)
and [3, 3-e,0, 0, 0, 0, 0]/(6-e) . The c5 column
above is dominated by c2 column, so it can be crossed out -- T.B.