For more information about this meeting, contact Christopher Byrne, Robin Enderle, Andrew Belmonte.
|Title:||Rational behavior in an epidemic game|
|Seminar:||Game Theory Seminar|
|Speaker:||Dongmei Zhang, Dept of Mathematics, Penn State University|
|Epidemics of infectious diseases, like smallpox, cholera, and HIV, have been a major health issue around the world. Some infectious diseases, like HIV and malaria, continue to reduce global health, in part because of poor treatment options and the absence of effective vaccines. This leaves behavior-based interventions as people’s primary tool for managing risk., and changes in behavior often come at a price. Therefore, people have to consider balancing the risk of illness against the costs of prevention. Due to the feedback loop between behavior and disease prevalence, the optimal behavior of one person depends on the behavior of everybody else. In this talk, I present the use of games in epidemiology to model such interaction and identify the non-trivial Nash equilibrium behavior strategy when the epidemic dynamics reach certain steady-state with numerical simulation. To be more realistic, our model takes in to account the heterogeneity of the population regarding both time since infection and time since birth (age) on a continuous level. Several transmission cases have been investigated in detail as examples.|
Room Reservation Information
|Date:||11 / 29 / 2012|
|Time:||01:00pm - 02:00pm|