PSU Mark
Eberly College of Science Mathematics Department

Meeting Details

For more information about this meeting, contact Peter Gael.

Title:Parametric and semiparametric structural estimation of Hotelling-Type discrete choice games in a single market with an increasing number of players
Seminar:SIAM Student Chapter Seminar
Speaker:Haiqing Xu, Department of Economics, Penn State University
Abstract Link:
Consider observations from a single equilibrium of a Hotelling–type model with exogenous locations in which each player, a firm, has a finite number of actions (discrete choice) and is subject to interactions that are local–for example, the two surrounding neighbors in a “linear” Hotelling model. Asymptotics in this setting is studied by assuming that all the players are located in a single market and that the number of them grows. All observations are potentially dependent to each other because they are interpreted as arising from a single equilibrium of settings where players interact directly or indirectly. Simple assumptions about the structure are made that ensure that the game with a fixed number of players has a unique equilibrium and the equilibrium has a stability property. The formulation of this stability property is new and is the basis for consistency. I introduce an estimation procedure called (sieve) maximum approximated likelihood. This estimator has the same asymptotic properties as the corresponding maximum likelihood estimator, but is easier to compute.

Room Reservation Information

Room Number:MB113
Date:03 / 17 / 2011
Time:05:00pm - 06:15pm