For more information about this meeting, contact Peter Gael.
|Title:||Parametric and semiparametric structural estimation of Hotelling-Type discrete choice games in a single market with an increasing number of players|
|Seminar:||SIAM Student Chapter Seminar|
|Speaker:||Haiqing Xu, Department of Economics, Penn State University|
|Consider observations from a single equilibrium of a Hotelling–type model with exogenous locations in which each player, a firm, has a finite number of actions (discrete choice) and is subject to interactions that are local–for example, the two surrounding neighbors in a “linear” Hotelling model. Asymptotics in this setting is studied by assuming that all the players are located in a single market and that the number of them grows. All observations are potentially dependent to each other because they are interpreted as arising from a single equilibrium of settings where players interact directly or indirectly. Simple assumptions about the structure are made that ensure that the game with a fixed number of players has a unique equilibrium and the equilibrium has a stability property. The formulation of this stability property is new and is the basis for consistency. I introduce an estimation procedure called (sieve) maximum approximated likelihood. This estimator has the same asymptotic properties as the corresponding maximum likelihood estimator, but is easier to compute.|
Room Reservation Information
|Date:||03 / 17 / 2011|
|Time:||05:00pm - 06:15pm|